



OT

OSSERVATORIO TERRORISMO

Newsletter n.13



OSSERVATORIO TERRORISMO

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Osservatorio Terrorismo –

Newsletter

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Osservatori a livello internazionale:

OT FranciaOT Germania OT UK OT Spagna OT USA

In questo numero hanno collaborato, per i sopradetti osservatori, i Sigg.:

Romain Defline Carlos Vázquez

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Editorial (italian version following)

Dear Readers,

we continued the experience of OT strengthened by your feedback and contributions that allow us to define better the targets of the newsletter. As you can see we go on to expand our perimeter of analysis because we think that only if we are able to compare our experience with other foreign practices we can give to our readers very important suggestions and valid helps. It's a great satisfaction to have new foreign readers but it's also a high responsibility to continue to meet the expectations of the Italian colleagues and friends and to be able to be interesting also for the foreign readers and contributors.

In this number you can read a general view of the different ways on how to manage the critical situation of a bomb alarm. Thanks to the suggestion of a British colleague, we compared the experiences of different countries and sectors in face of a bomb threat: several check lists can give us a clear picture of how a dramatic situation could be managed in the best way.

We received a very interesting article from our friend Carlos Vasquez, Vicepresident of FORO EFITEC, a Spanish Association of security managers of financial sector, a sort of twin of A.N.S.S.A.I.F., about the Jihadist threat in Spain. Our Spanish friends have been affected in a dramatic way by the terrorists during the last years. This terrible experience forced them to elaborate a solid capacity to face the menace and react to protect the people and the democratic State. Carlos Vaquez gives us a wonderful scenario of the Jihadist threat, who are the terrorists and how they start and complete the radicalization process. We appreciated also the explanation of the cooperation between Spanish and Portuguese Law Enforcement for the fight against terrorism.

Thanks to Romain Defline, a member of A.N.S.S.A.I.F. Executive Committee we can offer a review of the book "Comment réagir face à une personne radicalisée? : Pistes de réflexion et outils" (How do we respond to a person that has become radicalized? : Ideas for reflection and means) that shows the experience of a Belgian woman Laura Passoni who decided to join the Islamic State and become a Jihadist's wife. The history of Laura Passoni allows us to understand the recruiting process, the life in IS and her reconciliation with the Western culture.

We anticipate that in the next number we will illustrate you the new approach of A.B.I. (Italian Banking Association) on the prevention of terrorism and other crimes through a new format of Protocol to prevent crimes against banks and its customers. Meantime we'll start to extend our area of interest to the topics of cybersecurity, cyber - physical security and finance related to the terrorism. The

new European Directive 2018/843 against money laundering will take place only in 2019 although since November 1th also Malta, after Switzerland, South Korea and Estonia, become a State "friend" of crypto currencies. In our vision it is important to pay attention to the phenomenon to understand the risk of a link with terrorist organizations.

We are pleased to quote a sentence of Cremète in the act *Heautontimorùmenos* (written by Publio Terenzo Afro more than two thousand years ago) when he says "humani nihil a me alienum puto" (Nothing human is stranger to me). The terrorism could be defeated not only with the force but we also need to recapture people thank to our culture and values. We have to remember that the basis of our world are achievements that allowed an extraordinary level of tolerance, freedom, peace and economic development.

Many thanks for your attention and we wish you a pleasant reading.

The Editorial Office

Editoriale

Cari Lettori,

come avete visto in questo numero siamo partiti con una novità: la maggiore parte dei testi sono in lingua inglese. Non ce ne vogliate, continueremo a scrivere anche in Italiano ma abbiamo voluto dare concretezza anche nell'Editoriale alla nostra evoluzione. Una parte dei nostri collaboratori e lettori non sono italiani e riteniamo importante continuare ad avvalerci del loro contributo. Il fenomeno del terrorismo, molto più che in passato, richiede un confronto e una collaborazione a livello internazionale, pertanto cerchiamo anche noi di migliorare tale aspetto impegnandoci a superare le barriere linguistiche.

Per noi si tratta di una grande soddisfazione avere nuovi lettori, ma è anche una grande responsabilità continuare a soddisfare le aspettative dei colleghi e degli amici italiani e scrivere su motivi di interesse anche per i lettori e i contributori che non vivono direttamente l'esperienza italiana.

In questo numero vi proponiamo pertanto una panoramica generale dei diversi modi per la gestione di una situazione critica quale un allarme bomba. Grazie al contributo di colleghi britannici abbiamo confrontato le esperienze di diversi paesi e settori di fronte a tale minaccia, check list diverse possono darci un quadro chiaro sulle modalità con cui una situazione critica potrebbe essere gestita nel modo migliore.

Abbiamo ricevuto un articolo molto interessante dal nostro amico Carlos Vasquez, vicepresidente di FORO EFITEC, un'associazione spagnola di security manager del settore finanziario, una sorta di A.N.S.S.A.I.F. spagnola, sulla minaccia jihadista in Spagna. I nostri amici spagnoli sono stati colpiti in modo drammatico dalla minaccia terroristica negli ultimi anni. Questa terribile esperienza li ha costretti a elaborare una ben strutturata capacità per affrontare la minaccia e reagire per proteggere le persone e le Istituzioni dello Stato democratico. Carlos Vaquez ci propone uno scenario complessivo della minaccia jihadista, chi sono i terroristi e come iniziano e completano il loro processo di radicalizzazione. Molto apprezzata anche l'illustrazione della cooperazione tra le forze dell'ordine spagnole e portoghesi per la lotta al terrorismo.

Grazie a Romain Defline, componente del Comitato Esecutivo di A.N.S.S.A.I.F. abbiamo un'interessante recensione del libro "Comment réagir face à une personne radicalisée? : Pistes de réflexion et outils "(Come fare fronte a una persona radicalizzata? Idee e strumenti per una riflessione) che mostra l'esperienza di una donna belga, Laura Passoni, che ha deciso di unirsi allo Stato islamico e diventare la moglie di un jihadista. La storia di Laura Passoni ci consente di

comprendere il processo di reclutamento, la vita nello stato dell'IS e la sua riconciliazione con la cultura occidentale.

Anticipiamo che nel prossimo numero vi illustreremo il nuovo approccio dell'A.B.I. (Associazione Bancaria Italiana) alla prevenzione del terrorismo e ad altri reati attraverso un nuovo format del Protocollo per la prevenzione dei reati contro le banche e i loro clienti. Nel frattempo, continueremo ad estendere le nostre aree di interesse ai temi della cybersecurity, della cyber physical security e della finanza legati al terrorismo. La nuova Direttiva europea 2018/843 contro il riciclaggio di denaro entrerà in vigore solo nel 2010, anche se dal 1 ° novembre 2018 Malta, dopo la Svizzera, la Corea del Sud e l'Estonia, è diventata uno stato "amico" delle criptovalute. Nella nostra visione è importante prestare attenzione al fenomeno per comprendere il rischio di un legame con organizzazioni terroristiche.

Ci piace infine concludere con una frase del personaggio di Cremète nella commedia *Heautontimorùmenos* (scritta da Publio Terenzo Afro più di duemila anni fa) quando dice "humani nihil a me alienum puto" (Nulla di ciò che è umano mi è estraneo). Sappiamo bene che il terrorismo può essere sconfitto non solo con la forza, ma dobbiamo anche riconquistare le persone alla nostra cultura e ai nostri valori. Dobbiamo ricordare che le basi del nostro mondo quelle che ci hanno permesso uno straordinario livello di tolleranza, libertà, pace e sviluppo economico.

Vi ringraziamo per la vostra attenzione e vi auguriamo una piacevole lettura.

La Redazione



Comment réagir face à une personne radicalisée? : Pistes de réflexion et outils (French Edition), Apr 25, 2018,

by Laura Passoni and Hicham Abdel Gawad

(How do we respond to a person that has become radicalized)

This book has been written by Laura Passoni, a person that had been radicalized to the point to make the travel to Syria and then came back, and Hicham Abdel Gawad, post graduated in history of religions and specialist of inter-religious dialogue.

The two authors, exploring the resources of their respective experiences, try to provide solutions when facing a radical person. Laura tells her own story, how she was recruited by Daesh, how she went to Syria, how she discovered the reality there and the return back home. Laura emphasizes the tactic used by her recruiter from Daesh to isolate her from her relatives and get her adhering to the ideology of Daesh. She also stresses the importance of the role of her family especially when she returned. An interesting aspect of her testimony relates to the damages caused to her family that felt guilty of not detecting the change in her situation.

Hicham details how Daesh distorts the scriptures or their messages to get the target to adhere to their fight and volunteer to go to Syria. He also shows how the recruiters adapt the message to the target so that the recruited person has the feeling he or she will be able to help there. I said help and not fight, as they promise that the person will for example nurse the innocent victims of the war. Hicham also provides another vision of the scriptures (Coran, Hadith...) that helps deconstruct the message of Daesh. Hicham gives a historical perspective to the various muslim writings. He especially distinguishes the Coran from the

other subsequent writings and also explicit that many of the rules brought to the fore or imposed by Daesh are not in the Coran.

Hicham also suggests an interesting approach, tried with some of his pupils, which consists in looking at a situation considering its complexity and avoiding focusing on a simple view of it. This approach, from his experience at school, enable people to keep the sense of proportion and lowers the level of violence in their speeches even when they had initially a very strong opposite view.

I had great interest in the reading of this book. It gave me a better understanding of both the process to radicalisation and the structures of the various writings in Islam. The reconciliation between a very strong personal experience and a more academic work (but not only) is also a great interest. The one limit I identify in this book is that not everyone will be able to master the suggested approach. It requires, as a matter of fact, skills in history and knowledges in religions. At least when facing a radical person, one should be able to find the right source of information and the proper assistance for a correct understanding of the writings.

Romain Defline



ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A BOMB THREAT.

Abbiamo ricevuto da un collega negli UK questo modulo da utilizzare in caso di avviso di una bomba in un sito dell'azienda ricevente la chiamata.

Sappiamo che tutte le grandi aziende, con il supporto e suggerimenti delle Forze dell'Ordine, hanno già da tempo dato le opportune istruzioni agli addetti al centralino telefonico ed alle segreterie, onde raccogliere più informazioni possibili dall'interlocutore generalmente anonimo. E' infatti importante raccogliere più informazioni possibili atte a facilitare la comprensione della fondatezza dell'allarme, la possibile localizzazione, e dati che possano aiutare nella individuazione del soggetto che manda l'allarme.

La checklist redatta all'uopo viene quindi dalle imprese illustrata agli operatori al centralino. E' fondamentale la preparazione di questi in modo da cogliere più dati possibili (il contenuto esatto del messaggio, la voce, l'accento, i rumori di fondo, ecc.).

La nostra esperienza ci dice che nella maggior parte dei casi si tratta di falsi allarmi, eseguiti da soggetti che vogliono interrompere l'attività lavorativa per varie ragioni. A volte sono dimostrativi, per avere pubblicità o per ricatto. Non pochi sono gli allarmi di chi sta per perdere il treno o l'aereo! O vuole assentarsi dall'ufficio o da scuola!

A questo proposito, nel piano di una scuola americana, fra le istruzioni, si legge:

« School Districts/Schools should work with telephone companies to install technology that can facilitate attempts to trace threatening calls. In addition, since hoax calls are often perpetrated by students who are absent from school, that day's absentee list should be examined carefully for potential sources of such calls.».

Istruzione pragmatica: cercate l'anonimo fra gli studenti assenti!

Purtroppo, vi sono casi nei quali effettivamente un artifizio è stato posto nel o al di fuori dell'edificio. Considerati i recenti eventi in diversi Paesi, ed il fatto che in passato in Italia ci sono stati eventi drammatici, non è sbagliato essere pronti ad una tale eventualità; pertanto, è doveroso trattare qualsiasi allarme in modo serio, prontamente.

E' bene quindi essere pronti. Anche perché, ricordiamolo, la preparazione preventiva ad un evento drammatico riduce fortemente la possibilità che le persone vadano in panico e compiano atti inconsulti.

Ciò richiede che sia redatta una procedura che preveda la raccolta di informazioni atte ad aiutare le Istituzioni nella individuazione del chiamante, chi avvisare in azienda (con relativi sostituti), l'evacuazione dell'edificio, la distanza minima da dove è stata segnalata o potrebbe situarsi la bomba, ecc.

Riteniamo di fare cosa utile, allegando il questionario ricevuto, per quelle aziende, piccole o medie che vogliano prepararsi ad un possibile anche se improbabile evento, o raffrontare le proprie indicazioni con altre.

Ringraziamo il collega che ci ha segnalato la scheda e, nell'ottica di fornire una visione più ampia sugli strumenti ed indicazioni delle Autorità in alcune nazioni, aggiungiamo alcune ulteriori schede ed informazioni.

Come si potrà notare osservando alcuni esempi, le indicazioni fornite dalle diverse Istituzioni ed Enti sono chiaramente molto simili.

Protective Marking: Restricted when Completed

Form 5474

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A BOMB THREAT

- 1 Remain calm and talk to the caller
- 2 Note the caller's number if displayed on your phone
- 3 If the threat has been sent via email or social media, see appropriate section below
- 4 If you are able to, record the call

5. How will it be detonated?

you, who did?
7. What is your name?

8. What is your address?

6. Did you place the bomb? If not

9. What is your telephone number?

10. Do you represent a group or are you acting alone?

11. Why have you placed the bomb?

Record time call completed:

When Where What How Who Why Time

ASK THESE QUESTIONS & RECORD ANSWERS AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE:

1. Where exactly is the bomb right now?

2. When is it going to explode?

3. What does it look like?

4. What does the bomb contain?


10

Protective Marking: Restricted when Completed

INFORM BUILDIN	ig securi	TY / COORDIN	IATING MAN	IAGER		
Name and telephone person informed:	e number o	f .				
DIAL 999 AND IN	FORM PO	LICE				
Time informed:	80 00 80				ine i wili	
This part should be manager have all be			as hung up and	police / building	security / co	ordinating
Date and Time of call:						
Duration of call:						
The telephone number that received the call:				P (8 12) 1 2 2000		
ABOUT THE CALLER:		Male □	Female	Nationality		Age
THREAT LANGUAGE:		Well-spokeп	Irrational	Taped	Foul I	ncoherent
CALLER'S VOICE:		Calm	Crying Cl	earing Throat	Angry	Nasal
Slurred	Excited	Stutter	Disguised	Slow	Lisp	Accent*
Rapid	Deep	Familiar**	Laughter	Hoarse	Other (Please	specify)
* What Accent?						
** If the voice sounded who did it sound like?	familiar,					
		Street Noises	House Noises	Animal Noises	Crockery	Motor
Clear	Voice	Static	PA System	Booth	Music	
Factory Machin	nery	Office Machinery		Other (Please Specify)		Î

REMARKS:						
ADDITIONAL NOTES:						
gnature _		Print Name				
CTIO		KEN ON RECEIPT (OF A BOMB THREAT AL MEDIA			
1 (DO NOT reply to, forw	ard or delete the message				
2 1	f Sent via email, note	the address				
3 !	If sent via social media, what application has been used and what is the username / ID					
4 C	Dial 999 and follow po	lice guìdance				
		es for your organisations to help t t message and 48 hours after)	the police investigation (as a guide, 7			
gnature _		Print Name	Date			

Molto simile è quello suggerito dal Department of Homeland Security però più sintetico, più facile da usare:



L'Originale è sul sito: https://emilms.fema.gov/is906/assets/ocsobomb_threat_samepage-brochure.pdf

Ecco invece cosa dispone la Università di Harvard:



BOMB THREATS

Each year, several bomb threats are phoned into various University offices. Persons receiving a bomb threat should take it seriously, not ignore it, and **contact the HUPD immediately at 617-495-1212**. Each school or department may have its own procedures to follow in the case of a bomb threat. Please consult with the building facility manager for a copy of their bomb threat procedures.

When you receive a bomb threat please note as much information on this page as possible and as quickly as possible.

Remember to keep calm, listen carefully and if possible ask for the information listed.

- When is the bomb going to explode?
- Where is the device right now?
- What does the device look like?
- What kind of bomb is it?
- What will cause it to detonate, (e.g., radio signal, and time delay fuse)?
- Did you place the bomb?
- Why was it placed?
- What is your address?
- What is your name?

Please note the following:

Exact wording of the threat

- Estimate the sex of the caller
- Estimate the race of the caller
- Estimate the age of the caller
- Exact time of call
- Exact words of caller

•

- The nature/character of the caller's voice (i.e. loud, soft, angry, fast, slow, nasal, accent)
- The nature of any background noises (i.e. voices, animals, trains, airplanes, music, traffic)
- The language used (i.e. foul, well spoken, taped, message read, irrational)
- Upon receipt of a bomb threat please call the Harvard University Police Department's emergency number at 617-495-1212 and notify your supervisor or department head. Once you have notified HUPD, you should conduct a cursory search of your area to identify suspicious or unfamiliar packages or other items Do not touch these items! Advise the HUPD of their location

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Confidenziale

The HUPD will immediately dispatch officers investigate the call and take whatever police action may be deemed necessary and reasonable for the safety of the community. When deemed appropriate, the HUPD will conduct a search of the building or of specific locations in or about the building with the assistance and cooperation of the department head and/or building manager. After an evaluation/assessment of the content of the bomb threat, the decision to evacuate or close a building shall be made jointly, whenever possible, by the HUPD and the department head and/or building manager.

Every bomb threat or incident of a suspected explosive device should be considered as valid until all reasonable precautions for public safety have been taken or until the danger to life and property is terminated.

Molto simile anche la checklist, diffusa a tutto il personale, in altre università, come ad esempio quella di Toledo, Ohio, USA

(http://www.utoledo.edu/depts/safety/docs/EP-08-004%20Appendix%20A.pdf).

Non dissimili le indicazioni che possiamo trovare in Canada.

In questo caso, il Governo canadese ricorda, con forte enfasi, ai datori di lavoro la responsabilità penale di preparare il personale ad affrontare anche questi possibili allarmi.

Un altro esempio ce lo fornisce l'osservatorio francese e riguarda le istruzioni in una scuola in Belgio:

Quand envisager un risque d'alerte terroriste (bombe ou colis suspect) / Que faire?

Un risque d'alerte pour un acte terroriste à la bombe doit être envisagé à la suite :

- d'un appel téléphonique ;
- de la réception d'un message écrit ou enregistré (lettre, fax, message électronique ou enregistré, ...);
- de la découverte d'un colis, valise, sac, boîte ou tout autre objet qui de par sa présence à un endroit, sa forme, sa nature,... paraît suspect.

Procédure lors de la réception d'un appel téléphonique / Que faire ?

- ✓ Demeurez calme et courtois, évitez la panique.
- ✓ Ecoutez très attentivement et notez un maximum d'informations. Faites durer la conversation le plus longtemps possible.
- ✓ Portez une attention particulière aux caractéristiques de la voix et à tout autre son entendu afin d'identifier au mieux la personne (voix masculine ou féminine, accent, ...) ainsi que l'endroit d'où elle pourrait appeler (bruits de fond, train, avion,...).

- ✓ N'interrompez pas l'appelant et tentez d'obtenir le plus d'informations possibles par exemple :
 - o noter le numéro de téléphone du correspondant (s'il y a un afficheur)
 - o noter les paroles prononcées
 - o noter l'heure et la date prévues de l'explosion
 - o noter l'endroit prévu de l'explosion et le type d'engin explosif
 - o noter les voix ou les bruits ambiants
 - o noter le motif ou la raison de cette menace
 - o noter la date et l'heure de l'appel.
- ✓ Eteindre les téléphones portables. En effet, il existe des systèmes pouvant être activés par des ondes radio (et donc également celles générées par un GSM).
- ✓ Dès que la communication est terminée, remplissez la liste de contrôle intitulée «Procédure alerte à la bombe ».
- ✓ Informez la Direction, le responsable de l'établissement.
- ✓ Appelez la Police au n° 101 via un téléphone fixe.
- ✓ Si nécessaire, commencez l'évacuation du bâtiment en suivant la procédure en cas d'incendie. Ce sont les Services de secours qui décident de l'opportunité d'évacuer ou non le bâtiment en fonction de la situation qui se présente.
- ✓ En cas d'évacuation, insistez pour que chacun prenne ses affaires personnelles (mallette, sac à dos,...) afin d'identifier les colis non suspects.
- ✓ Avant de quitter sa classe, le professeur vérifie s'il n'y a rien de suspect et affiche sur la porte d'entrée un signe distinctif (ex : écrire sur la porte à la craie « vide ») et ferme la porte.
- ✓ Se rendre au lieu de rassemblement : ce lieu doit être à au moins 200 m du site.
- ✓ S'assurer que l'endroit est sûr (vérifier si absence d'objets suspects). Ce lieu ne peut être en vue direct avec l'objet suspect ni situé près d'une surface vitrée (afin d'éviter les effets de l'onde de choc).
- ✓ Attendre les instructions des Services de Police ou du Directeur des Opérations dépêché sur place.

Procédure lors de la réception d'un message écrit ou enregistré / Que faire ? Evitez la panique.

- ✓ Eteindre les téléphones portables. En effet, il existe des systèmes pouvant être activés par des ondes radio (et donc également celles générées par un GSM).
- ✓ Informez la Direction, le responsable de l'établissement.
- ✓ S'il s'agit d'un message écrit ou d'un enregistrement, minimiser la manipulation en le plaçant dans une enveloppe vierge en papier ou en plastique.
- ✓ Appelez la Police au n° 101 via un téléphone fixe.
- ✓ Si nécessaire procédez à l'évacuation des bâtiments en suivant la procédure en cas d'incendie. Ce sont les Services de secours qui décident de l'opportunité d'évacuer ou non le bâtiment en fonction de la situation qui se présente.
- ✓ En cas d'évacuation, insistez pour que chacun prendre ses affaires personnelles (mallette, sac à dos,...) afin d'identifier les colis non suspects

- ✓ Avant de quitter sa classe, le professeur vérifie s'il n'y a rien de suspect et affiche sur la porte d'entrée un signe distinctif (ex : écrire sur la porte à la craie « vide ») et ferme la porte.
- ✓ Se rendre au lieu de rassemblement : ce lieu doit être à au moins 200 m du site. S'assurer que l'endroit est sûr (vérifier si absence d'objets suspects). Ce lieu ne peut être en vue direct avec l'objet suspect ni situé près d'une surface vitrée (afin d'éviter les effets de l'onde de choc).
- ✓ Attendre les instructions des Services de Police ou du Directeur des Opérations dépêché sur place.

Procédure lors de la découverte d'un objet ou colis suspect

Si un paquet suspect est découvert dans l'établissement, il convient d'en rechercher le propriétaire dans les plus brefs délais. Si le propriétaire ne se manifeste pas, appliquer le dispositif suivant :

- ✓ Que faire ?
- ✓ Demeurez calme.
- ✓ Eteindre les téléphones portables. En effet, il existe des systèmes pouvant être activés par des ondes radio (et donc également celles du GSM).
- ✓ Ne pas manipuler le paquet ou l'objet, ne pas le mouiller, ne l'ouvrir en aucun cas.
- ✓ Ecartez les personnes à proximité.
- ✓ Informez la Direction, le responsable de l'établissement.
- ✓ Appelez la Police au n° 101 via un téléphone fixe. Décrire l'endroit où se trouve l'objet, indiquer le chemin vers cet endroit à partir de l'entrée du site.
- ✓ Ouvrez les fenêtres et les portes environnantes où l'objet ou le colis suspect a été découvert.
- ✓ Si nécessaire, commencez l'évacuation du bâtiment en suivant la procédure en cas d'incendie. Ce sont les Services de secours qui décident de l'opportunité d'évacuer ou non le bâtiment en fonction de la situation qui se présente.
- ✓ En cas d'évacuation, laisser chacun prendre ses affaires personnelles (mallette, sac à dos,...)
- ✓ Avant de quitter sa classe, le professeur vérifie s'il n'y a rien de suspect et affiche sur la porte d'entrée un signe distinctif (ex : écrire sur la porte à la craie « vide ») et ferme la porte.
- ✓ Se rendre au lieu de rassemblement : ce lieu doit être à au moins 200 m du site. S'assurer que l'endroit est sûr (vérifier si absence d'objets suspects). Ce lieu ne peut être en vue direct avec l'objet suspect ni situé près d'une surface vitrée (afin d'éviter les effets de l'onde de choc).
- ✓ Attendre les instructions des Services de Police ou du Directeur des Opérations dépêché sur place.

In questo esempio si può notare che molte istruzioni sono analoghe a quelle di altre nazioni. Si possono però osservare alcune differenziazioni rispetto agli altri esempio

La prima è che i docenti inducono gli alunni a prendere i loro oggetti dalla classe, al fine di agevolare la individuazione di una eventuale bomba. Inoltre, una volta usciti tutti dall'aula, il docente scrive "vuota" sulla porta dopo averla chiusa: ciò agevola l'intervento dei soccorsi.

Non ci convince molto la indicazione di portarsi ad una distanza minima di 200mt. da dove potrebbe essere la bomba, o da dove è stato individuato il pacco sospetto. A nostro avviso, anche sulla base di quanto ci ha affermato un artificiere, la distanza minima è bene sia di almeno 500 mt.

Bisogna ricordarsi che oltre all'onda d'urto, che può provocare la morte per sfondamento del torace, questa può far cadere e spargere in aria oggetti a grande distanza.

Anthony Cecil Wright



Jihadist threat in Spain overview

1- Introduction

The purpose of this document is to provide a brief, but clear, vision about jihadist terrorism in Spain and the possible future of this threat with a short mention to Portugal due to its vicinity.

2- Background

Spain had a wide and sad experience with the local terrorism of ETA. That permitted the Spanish Law Enforcement applied all the knowledge to the new emerging threat.

Traditionally and since the dictatorship of General Franco, Spain always had a close relationship with the Arab countries, especially Morocco, defending even the Palestinian cause. Moreover despite the fact that the PLO and the Algerian government trained ETA terrorists in their training camps.

Base on that hypothesis the Spanish population did not consider the Islamist threat as threat.

However, as we are going to see later in this document, something was moving on among the population of Muslim origin in Spain.

In 2004, Bin Laden identified Spain as a target jointly with the rest of countries took part in the Western Coalition that invaded Iraq.

On the left, the map of "Al-Andalus" in the year 732. The jihadists see Spain as the land of Islam invaded by unfaithful. "Al-Andalus" has been a recurrent reference on relevant Jihadist broadcasts. As well as Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish cities located in northern Morocco) as Al-Zawahiri did once on Al Jazeera television comparing their situation with that of Chechnya.

3- Most important attacks

Islamist terrorism dates back to the year 1985. On April 12, it was produced an attack to a restaurant frequented by US citizens serving in a military camp close to that place.

However, all victims were Spanish.

March 11, 2004. A combined attack against several trains in Madrid. In these attacks, with a result of 191 casualties and almost 2.000 injuries. Some days after, most of the suspects dead exploding a bomb in a flat near Madrid.

August 17, 2017. A single terrorist drove a van along a crowded street at Barcelona, killing and injuring several pedestrians. On that night the van driver that stolen a car killing the driver, run over some people at Cambrils, a city not far from Barcelona. The police dejected him, as well as another group intercepted in a police control.

In total 15 people were killed and 135 injured in Barcelona and Cambrils (autonomous region of Catalonia).

4- Current Alert level

Since the end of 2015, the antiterrorist alert in Spain is at a high level (4 on a scale of 1 to 5). This is a direct consequence of the series of terrorist acts directly or indirectly related to ISIS in France, Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom.

5- Muslim population distribution in Spain

First, we have to establish that there is a difference between countries in EU.

Meanwhile in some of the central part (UK, France Belgium or Germany, for example) Muslim populations are made up of descendants of immigrants from Islamic countries. These second or third generations are more vulnerable to the propaganda issued by the Islamic State (IS). This is not the same in Spain or Italy. After 11M attacks in Madrid, Spanish law Enforcement began monitoring the potential elements that could repeat a similar action. The Spanish Elcano Royal Institute on its Program on Jihadist Global Terrorism indicates that the 124 fellows arrested between June 2013 and May 2016 for their involvement in activities related to the Islamic State, as well as the 160 foreign terrorist fighters who travelled to Syria, were sufficient figures to be worried.

6- Jihadism in Spain

Having a look at Barcelona attack it is easy to see the repetition of the methods used in other attacks in Europe. Terrorist organized in small groups well inspired or led by their reference organizations based abroad. By failing the initial plan to attack a large quantity of explosives (gas cylinders), they can use less sophisticated methods, but equally effective, to provoke atrocities, such as vehicles without a bomb and knives. In any case, the ability of terrorists to improvise their modus operandi is relevant.

7- Radicalization process

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To analyse how the radicalization process, we will divide in several steps:

a. How radicalization happens

As it described in a report issued by "Elcano Royal Institute", in a study published on July 2016 showed that many of the detainees or dead in Spain for activities related to this jihadist organization were basically, young men born in Morocco. They belonged to the second generations. The report revealed that most of them were radicalized since 2012, in physical contact with a radicalization agents or other individuals (in the company of others and not alone) with whom they had close prior social ties. Just a third of them inserted into cells, groups or networks with operational capabilities to attempt in Spain.

b. Jihadist mobilization of children in Spain

Children and adolescents indoctrination was unknown until recent times. Between 2013 and 2017, at least 36 jihadists focused on mobilizing young people who had not reached the age of majority. A set of several factors conditioned their activities: the existence of previous personal ties between the recruiter and the minor and his age.

Investigators now have a path to develop a typology of the formulas used in Spain for the radicalization and jihadist recruitment of children under 18 years of age.

c. When are they radicalized?

Jihadists arrested in Spain are jihadist Salafism followers. The beginning of the jihadist radicalization process use to begin during youth, when they are more vulnerable. On this age, people go through stages prior to adult maturity. Radicalization picks coinciding with periods of convulsive events in the Arab countries, such as Afghanistan wars (Russian and American invasions), Iraq war and the civil war in Algeria or the Arab Spring. In Spain, some studies have established two periods in which radicalization has been greater. A first from 1999 to 1994 and another one from 2000 to 2004. In particular, six out of ten arrested or deaths in Spain between 2004 and 2014 had some kind of connection with the 11-M attacks.

d. Where are they radicalized?

Radicalization can happen in the countries of origin, Algeria, Pakistan, Morocco or Syria. Later the list was reduced to Pakistan and Morocco. Now the radicalization takes place in Spain. Muslim population is Spain splits by Autonomous communities as follows:

- •Madrid (46.4%) is the region that concentrates the most jihadists.
- •Catalonia (17.8%),

- •Valencia (12, 5%).
- •Castilla and León, Andalusia, Ceuta and Melilla have the rest.

Traditionally, radicalization took place in mosques and places of Islamic worship or in cultural centres. Later in places like hairdressers, clothing, food shops, restaurants or booths, controlled by jihadists. This process was very important during 2004-2012. In neighbourhoods like "Lavapies" in Madrid, with an important Muslim population, jihadists easily find support.

Currently, Internet forums are the most used way by indoctrinated people.

e. How are they radicalized?

Analysing condemned by jihadist terrorism in Spain, we can deduce that they radicalized themselves in the company of others and induced by an agent. These agents can be activists responsible for terrorist cells and capable of attracting and indoctrinating new members. 60% of radicalized individuals in Spain are included on this type. Other agents are religious leaders of the Islamic community, educators, friends, family and colleagues. 55.2% of the Spanish jihadists maintained some type of prior relationship based on ties of relationship, friendship or neighbourhood with an individual linked to terrorist activities.

f. Spanish Jihadist Profile

It is very difficult to define profiles, as they do not have any structure with a defined head and do not usually communicate with any other. However, with the previous information, we can try to define a profile of the jihadists in Spain: Man between 20 and 38 years old. There are more married than single. Since 2013, half of them had Moroccan nationality and four of ten are Spanish. There are less immigrants and more of second generations. One of ten is a convert. Finally seven of ten radicalized themselves in Spain.

Nevertheless, everything changed since 2013, a new unprecedented mobilization stimulated by the active jihadist organizations in Syria and Iraq. Despite Spain is not one the most affected Western European nations with a very large Muslim population. The main place for the current Spanish jihadist mobilization by the Islamic State is Barcelona province, but we cannot forget cities like Ceuta and Melilla where there are neighbourhoods fully occupied by Muslim population. This population represents the majority in these small cities.

In accordance with Police assessments, all imprisoned persons are very dangerous, because they can organize and commit attacks in a very short time.

They have a brutal concept for their life, as they do not have references. They are aware that can fall into the attack. They want to be a reference by themselves.

g. Violent radicalization prevention

In 2005, the EU established the strategy, to prevent violent radicalization based on four pillars. From that moment, all members adopted it. Spain started in 2010, and Portugal in 2015.

8- Law Enforcement activity

Spanish Law Enforcement activity follows different ways. We have to mention the experience of years struggling against ETA terrorist organization has developed information services and operational units of first level. The fluid and constant exchange information with other European, USA and Moroccan security corps that was very useful in the past is now of great importance. This collaboration has made possible to carry out simultaneous operations in several countries or provide information that has allowed the dismantling terrorist cells plans or arrest of possible terrorists in other countries.

During the year 2017, 68 people died (62 of them by jihadists) and 844 injured in terrorist attacks in the European Union. The number of casualties is lower than in 2016, but the number of attacks in Europe increased.

Between 1995 and 2004, just over a hundred people was arrested in Spain charged by activities related to jihadist terrorism. Between 2004 and 2012, the number of detainees in the course of police operations against jihadist terrorism exceeded 470, raising the annual average to 54. As we can see this figure is clearly higher than that recorded between 1995 and 2004. Regulations were adapted giving Police corps a chance to anticipate Intelligence to avoid the preparation of attacks.

Collaboration with Portuguese Law Enforcement

Experts define the level of collaboration between Spain and Portugal in the best terms at all levels, and in all directions. There are several forums, especially those dedicated to the prevention of violent radicalization, where the bilateral relationship is narrow and find frameworks common action.

Spain and Portugal share 1,214 km of border in the Iberian Peninsula. Both countries have appeared several times, as the target of their actions, in the jihadist propaganda. Since 2012, many new jihadist of European origin, move to the conflict in Syria and Iraq. This also affected to Spain and Portugal less than to other countries with an important Muslim population.

However, this movement is something to consider as a potential threat in the future Spain and Portugal Law Enforcement maintain open and fluid channels of information exchange and cooperation between the different corps responsible for the fight against terrorism on both sides of the border. The Portuguese Judicial Police, reporting into the Ministry of Justice, is the responsible for the fight again.

terrorism in Portugal and a key factor for the international cooperation. They work with the Spanish General Police Information Office of the National Police and the Civil Guard Information Service, both reporting to the Ministry of the Interior. Also at Intelligence level, the Portuguese Security Information Service (SIS) works with its Spanish counterpart, the National Intelligence Center (CNI).

9- Social perception.

Spanish people in general, still must learn about resilience against violent extremism.

The perception of the terrorist threat in Spain is followed by the Spanish Sociological Research Center "Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas español (CIS)" in its different quarterly waves. In addition, reports provided by Eurostad are a relevant information. According to these metrics, terrorist threat occupies the fifth place, after unemployment, corruption, Catalonian secessionism and the economic environment.

On these reports, we can see that data perception among young people falls down even more. During the years when the local terrorist organization ETA was active, terrorism was always on Top 3. However now, in relation to jihadist terrorism, the existing or not of attacks in the country or in one of the Europe affect to this perception.

10- Forecast

Despite it is quite complicated to estimate what may happen in the future In terms of terrorism, how this threat is going evolve as it depends on many factors. However and due to previous experiences in the case of jihadist terrorism, we can identify some of the more determining factors.

- •Cultural components, which are very different from the values that predominantly predominate in the western world. The endemic problems in the Middle East region that generate tension and feed this terrorism.
- •What is going to happen with the foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq?
- •What will happen to the imams who lead Muslim populations in western world?
- •What will happen with the second and third generations in the countries of southern Europe?
- •If they are going to evolve as in Central Europe or they are going to be more integrated.
- •What will happen to the incessant immigration that reaches the southern borders every day?

•How conflicts will evolve in the Sahel. If new failed states will appear in countries with a high Muslim population.

According to the experts that analyses this phenomenon in Spain, we can expect a growth jihadism for the next ten years, so it will continue being the main global threat. Keeping the current model of alert levels at maximum. However, it is important keep control over returned terrorist fighters and combat the jihadist propaganda. As well as maintaining control over the individuals at risk and if one gets out of line, stop it.

A recent Europol report highlights some of the main trends in past attacks, which can help prevent future ones:

They prefer to attack people, instead of other objectives, provoking an emotional response from the population (Paris, May 2018, Barcelona, and August 2017) Attacks on authority or religious symbols (Liege, May 2018, Trèbes, March 2018) Attacks on Western lifestyle symbols (Manchester, May 2017) Possible new attacks on EU by jihadist terrorists, following one of these patterns, or a combination of them, are very likely.

Additionally to jihadist attacks increase, the preparation and execution is becoming less sophisticated.

Jihadist terrorists are often lone wolfs. They can prepare the attack by themselves or facilitated by others.

Online propaganda and the use of social networks have been evidenced as essential means to recruit, radicalize and get money. The rudimentary knowledge of Islam in most of potential attackers make them vulnerable to influence and manipulation.

Domestic terrorists, some of them homegrown, perpetrated most of recent jihadist attacks. Radicalized without having traveling to other countries. There is a great variety of attackers, some of them known by the police, but not because of terrorist activities.

Most do not have no direct links with any jihadist organization. The degradation of the so-called "organizational structures of the Islamic State" (IS) does not imply a reduction in the threat of jihadist terrorism. Terrorist activities in the EU are guided or inspired by IS but Al Qaeda or other jihadist organizations remain a real possibility.

To understand better the Jihadist threat in Spain, I strongly recommend consulting "Actividad yihadista en España, 2013-2017: de la Operación Cesto en Ceuta a los atentados en Cataluña" by Fernando Reinares y Carola García-Calvo Madrid, 25/09/2018

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